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1 Introduction
In many countries, including those of the European Union, owners of fixed
telecommunications networks are obliged to give access to alternative opera-
tors providing competing retail services such as voice communications, broad-
band access and even subscription television. The pricing of this access is a
thorny issue, and several different approaches have been used over time. The
standard regulatory mechanism adopted by both the EU and other regulators
worldwide is the “cost orientation” principle, according to which the access
charge should fully cover access costs. Cost orientation can be seen as a nat-
ural obligation in cases involving access to an essential facility held by an
incumbent operator, but its implementation might differ considerably. The
most prominent method is the LRIC (long-run incremental cost) approach to
define access charges. Since the mid-1990s it has been used widely by regula-
tors, especially in the EU. This method has been very successful in generating
low prices and creating service competition that allowed for some product dif-
ferentiation. It worked well for legacy networks that required no or little new
investment: Incumbents earned good returns and were shielded from expropri-
ation tendencies of regulators, while maintaining retail market competition.
Still, early on LRIC access charges were criticized as hindering investments
in new, to-be-sunk networks, in particular in the presence of uncertainty about
future demand and willingness to pay. The strongest advocate of this cri-
tique was Hausman (1997) based on the work of (his MIT colleague) Pindyck
and others, who developed “real option” theory (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994,
Pindyck 2007). Empirical evidence by many authors, surveyed first by Cam-
bini and Jiang (2009); later by Briglauer et al. (2015), confirms Hausman’s
conjecture. While these criticisms of the LRIC approach arose already when
legacy copper networks were opened to access, they have gained a new urgency
due to the perceived necessity of investment in dense fiber networks, in fiber-
to-the-home and in increased capacity to serve the infrastructure for mobile
broadband. Incentives for network coverage, while maintaining a suitable level
of competition and entry, are now at the forefront of regulatory policy concerns
as broadband markets face a rather slow transition from traditional copper to
high-capacity fiber networks, even though these investments are considered
essential for economic growth.1 Indeed, the new EU regulatory framework for
telecommunications of 2018 (EECC) explicitly introduces investment in ultra-
fast coverage as an additional main policy goal besides enhanced competition,
in order to achieve the European broadband coverage goals for 2020 and 2025
(European Commission 2010 and 2016, respectively).
As a result, regulators need to adapt existing network access schemes to si-
multaneously guarantee competition and network roll-out, in particular when
future demand for high-capacity services is still quite uncertain. Hausman
(1997, 1999) suggested additional mark-ups on LRIC prices (also called “risk
1 See Abrardi and Cambini (2019) for a survey about the impact of ultra-fast broadband
investment on different economic dimensions.
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premia”) as a remedy for the investment problem. We consider this proposal,
as well as ex ante option payments for the right to buy access at LRIC without
mark-up, and long-term contracts. Our goal is to contribute to the current pol-
icy debate about how to achieve sufficient network coverage in Europe, where
LRIC access charges have been used in almost all countries and also where
risk premia are being evaluated in order to provide incentives for investment
in ultra-fast broadband networks. Therefore, in order to capture both goals of
coverage and competition for the benefit of consumers, we concentrate on to-
tal coverage and entry thresholds as performance measures, while also keeping
track of the effect of access schemes on consumer and total surplus.
Model and Results: We analyze a model that focuses on geographic
coverage of a next generation network, i. e., ultra-fast broadband based on
fiber-optic technology. The incumbent firm chooses which areas to cover be-
fore knowing the level of demand. The latter becomes publicly known when
the investment has been undertaken. Since entrants ask for access after de-
mand is observed, they can cherry-pick the markets to enter, which in turn
affects investment incentives. Different regions will need different types of ac-
cess schemes, and thus we consider separately how well these schemes fare for
each specific area that lacks coverage under standard access regulation.
Standard access schemes make entrants pay by usage and let them choose
when and where to enter. As pointed out by Hausman (1997) and others, this
affords the entrants a free “access option”, i.e. the choice to only ask for access
when demand turns out to be high. The option value arises by protecting the
entrant against potential downsides, as discussed in the real-options literature.
But what really matters for our purpose is the “option externality” imposed
on the incumbent by the exercise of the entrant’s option, which consists in
the curtailing of the incumbent’s returns if demand is high. It is this option
externality that reduces the incumbent’s incentives for investment, and what
we are investigating are different schemes to compensate the incumbent.
The maximum coverage that can possibly be achieved, at least without
government subsidies, is the coverage chosen by a monopolist: Entry and com-
petition dissipate profits, and therefore, irrespectively of how investment costs
are shared, total profits under competition cannot cover the investment cost for
the most outlying areas. Therefore we take monopoly coverage as the bench-
mark. Second, the observed levels of demand for which the entrant asks for
access in different areas depend on the access scheme. We characterize the
minimum level of demand for which entry happens under the different access
schemes.
Our results are as follows: As a first extension to standard access charges
we consider the imposition of an additional margin just set high enough to
make the incumbent invest in uncovered areas. This can be understood as
a risk premium that compensates the incumbent partially for the risk it is
subjected to ex post by the uncertain entry decision. We find that this margin
can be set at a level that both makes the incumbent invest and safeguards
some (though less) entry. This margin increases with the level of investment
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cost, which raises retail prices and leads to lower consumer surplus compared
to the case where area could have been covered without a risk premium.
We then consider access options, which involve an up-front payment from
the entrant to the incumbent plus access at standard rates ex post. We deter-
mine the minimum up-front payment that just makes the incumbent invest,
and find that coverage can increase substantially as compared to standard
access, while ex post market outcomes are not distorted. Still, due to profit
dissipation full monopoly coverage cannot be achieved while maintaining entry.
Finally, we look at long-term contracts, where the entrant commits ex ante
to buying a certain wholesale quantity. While this type of contract reduces
uncertainty for the investing firm, it has the drawback that ex post competition
will be fiercer, reducing returns on investment and potentially even lowering
coverage instead of increasing it.
A key point of our analysis is that different types of access schemes need to
be used in different types of areas. If the aim of the regulator is to guarantee
coverage with a minimum distortion of the local retail market equilibrium,
access options should be the first choice. Yet, these are not feasible in the
most expensive and outlying areas. In the latter, it is necessary to increase
the incumbent’s returns by adding a risk premium over the access charge. Any
accompanying reduction in achievable surplus due to the risk premium will be
limited to this specific area.
Related Literature: The literature on access regulation is quite extensive
(Vogelsang 2003), but it is scant when it comes to setting access charges in
the presence of demand uncertainty.
Authors in some early papers analyze the investment incentives in the
presence of demand uncertainty with different forms of regulation and mar-
ket competition. Guthrie et al. (2006) compare backward-looking (historical
cost) vs forward-looking (current cost) access pricing rules under cost uncer-
tainty with a decreasing trend. Similar to us they conclude that setting access
prices ex post retards investment. Hori and Mizuno (2006) analyze the effect
of access charges on firms’ (both incumbent and entrant) incentives to invest
in a network facility with a stochastically growing demand. They show that
in the presence of an increasing access charge, the incumbent may have the
incentive to preempt the market and therefore invest first in areas where an
entrant may find it profitable to invest, too. In a companion paper (Hori and
Mizuno, 2009), the authors compare the impact of facility based competition
and service based competition on the incentive to invest in a new advanced
network. They show that, when the monopoly rent due to uncertainty is large,
the initial introduction of the new infrastructure is made earlier under facility-
based competition than under service-based competition, while the opposite
emerges when the degree of uncertainty and thus the monopoly rent is relative
small. Note that these papers all assume that uncertainty never actually re-
solves, implying that the firms face the same uncertain future at every instant.
This approach is different from ours since we assume that demand uncertainty
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resolves and access seekers might thus have an incentive to wait to reduce
demand risk.
Klumpp and Su (2010) are the first to consider a LRIC access pricing rule
and its effect on (quality) investment. Under certainty, they show that the
level of investment increases with the number of access seekers. Klumpp and
Su (2015) acknowledge that this result is not robust and empirically show
that in US electricity markets the opposite holds. They also consider forward-
looking LRIC under demand uncertainty and conclude that access truncates
returns in the good state, while in the bad state the incumbent is a monopolist
if the investment cost is high. Contrary to the case of certainty, investment is
lower than under monopoly if there are many entrants.
Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) compare different access pricing schemes. In
particular, they compare LRIC access regulation and a risk sharing agree-
ment – where the incumbent and the entrant operators decide to invest jointly
(i.e. to co-invest) rather than individually. They show that risk sharing can
lead to both stronger investment incentives and higher consumer welfare than
standard LRIC access regulation. Their framework differs from ours in sev-
eral important respects: First, they assume that investment increases quality,
while we model and determine equilibrium coverage explicitly. Second, they
assume guaranteed access to the copper network as the entrant’s outside op-
tion and only two demand states, while we consider a continuum of states and
are therefore able to determine entry thresholds. Third, their ex post LRIC
charge is determined retroactively as a function of realized (rather than ex-
pected equilibrium) quantities, which changes the strategic interaction and
puts both incumbent and entrant in a symmetric position. We follow regu-
latory practice and assume that firms take the access charge as given when
they choose their retail strategies, subjecting the entrant to a higher perceived
marginal cost than the incumbent.
Inderst and Peitz (2014) provide a high-level discussion of many (mostly
unregulated) access schemes, listing their advantages and disadvantages. They
consider mostly fixed fees including options, but also touch on usage-based
prices and conclude that while the latter reduce competitive intensity (if above
marginal cost) they increase incentives for investment as compared to fixed
fees.2 While they carefully model firms’ decisions both to invest in quality
and to enter, they do not consider coverage as such, which is the important
policy issue at the center of the present paper. Moreover, we provide a direct
comparison of access schemes in the pursuit of this coverage goal.
Using a similar coverage game, Bourreau et al. (2018) analyze co-investment
schemes and show that the presence of uncertainty reduces total coverage.
A recent companion paper, Bourreau et al. (2019), focuses on how to make
entrants co-invest early rather than wait (e.g., in France first investors are
required to allow later co-investment of other companies), using some related
policy measures. These papers deal with the impact of co-investment arrange-
2 Clark and Easaw (2007) use an option pricing approach to define access charges assuming
fixed retail prices. Competitive effects are therefore absent in their model.
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ments on the incentives to invest in ultra-fast broadband networks but they
do not consider explicitly the role of access regulation.
Briglauer et al. (2015) and Abrardi and Cambini (2019) review the em-
pirical literature and conclude that, while policy conclusions tend to be am-
biguous, there is a strong indication that access obligations negatively affect
investment incentives. In a recent empirical paper, Briglauer et al. (2018) study
how access regulation of legacy and fiber networks affects the incentives to in-
vest in ultra-fast broadband networks. They show that fiber access obligations
lead to a large reduction of the incumbents’ investments.
2 Model Setup
We consider a setting where an incumbent firm rolls out a next generation
network over a set of areas indexed by z ≥ 0. These areas are equal in their
demand characteristics, but have an increasing cost of coverage c (z), where
c (.) is continuous, increasing and c (0) = 0 (This setup can alternatively be
interpreted as depicting increasingly dispersed customers with a constant cost
of being covered). Investment cannot be replicated, therefore an entrant firm
must ask for access.3 Consumers’ willingness to pay is uncertain and is revealed
after the investment is made, therefore, dependent on the access scheme, the
entrant may be able to wait for this information before asking for access.4
Regulation, investment and entry occur in each area separately, and the ulti-
mate aim is to determine the extent of coverage and the accompanying local
market outcomes.
Thus the timing of our model is as follows: i) Taking into account local
investment costs, the regulator defines access schemes tailored to specific areas;
ii) if locally available, the entrant may enter into a long-term contract or buy
an access option; iii) the incumbent decides in which areas to invest, after
which demand is realized; iv) both operators observe local willingness to pay,
under the prevailing access scheme the entrant decides whether to enter or
not, and profits are realized.
In order to make our results both intuitive and robust, we impose assump-
tions directly on the outcomes of local market competition, instead of deriving
them from some specific model. Our model encapsulates all more specific mod-
els of price or quantity competition, product differentiation or homogeneous
goods, or even bundle competition, which satisfy these assumptions. Willing-




, δ̄ ≤ ∞, with an
(atomless) distribution function F . Profits are continuous in δ and almost
everywhere differentiable in the access charge a set by the regulator.
3 Any investment by entrants would occur in areas already covered by the incumbent,
such as cities. Since we want to focus on coverage of marginal areas, we abstract from
entrant investment. Moreover, we assume that next generation retail services are so superior
to copper-based services that previous copper coverage and access provisions do not matter.
4 Willingness to pay in different areas may be correlated, but this will not be relevant for
what follows.
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Ex post profits for the entrant are Π∗e (a, δ), increasing in δ. Entry occurs
only in the good demand states, i.e. if and only if willingness to pay δ is high
enough as compared to a. More formally, there is a strictly increasing and
differentiable function δ̂(a) such that Π∗e (a, δ) T 0 for δ T δ̂(a), and an access
charge ā such that δ̂ (ā) = δ̄ (entry is foreclosed if a > ā).
The incumbent obtains ex post profits of Π∗0 (a, δ), which are equal to
monopoly profits Π∗m(δ) < ∞ if no entry occurs. If the entrant is active,
i.e. δ ≥ δ̂(a), Π∗0 and joint profits Π∗0 + Π∗e are strictly increasing in a,
with Π∗0 < Π∗0 + Π∗e < Π∗m (competition dissipates profits). We may have
Π∗0 (a, δ̂(a)) < Π
∗
m(δ̂(a)), for instance if the entrant has fixed costs; in this case
the incumbent’s profits are discontinuous at this point.
A final assumption is needed for assessing the welfare impact of different
outcomes: Since a higher access charge raises retail prices, consumer surplus
CS(a, δ) and total surplus Π∗0 +Π∗e + CS are strictly decreasing in a.5
In an Online Appendix we report on a simple model which gives rise to lo-
cal market equilibria with the above-mentioned properties, involving quantity
competition under inverse demand P = δ (2−Q) with δ uniformly distributed
on [1− σ, 1 + σ] and 0 < σ < 1 indicating the degree of uncertainty. There we
also provide an illustrative numerical simulation of our more general results.
For the standard tariff with a simple access charge a per unit, ex post entry
occurs for δ ≥ δ̂(a), with ex ante expected profits










[Π∗m(δ)−Π∗0 (a, δ)]dF (δ),
E[Π∗e (a, δ)] =
∫ δ̄
δ̂(a)
Π∗e (a, δ)dF (δ).
Finally, the incumbent covers exactly the areas for which expected profits cover
investment costs. If no entry occurs, maximum coverage zm (the monopoly
benchmark) is given by c(zm) = E[Πm(δ)]. With entry, due to profit dissipa-
tion, coverage is reduced to zs with
c(zs) = E[Π∗0 (a, δ)] < E[Πm(δ)].
We will now determine the potential of alternative access schemes to increase
coverage while maintaining entry. In doing so, we evaluate both coverage and
consumer surplus.
5 It would be natural to assume that the incumbent’s profits and consumer surplus are
increasing in δ, but this assumption is not needed.
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Table 1 WACC and next generation risk premia in the EU.
Country Standard WACC Risk Premium
Denmark 6.78% 2%
Finland 6.50% 1.1%
Italy 8.77% FTTC 1.2, FTTH 3.2%
Luxembourg 7.10% 0.61%
Netherlands 6.06% 2.6%
United Kingdom 7.90% 1%
WACC: weighted average cost of capital; FTTC: fibre to the curb; FTTH: fibre to the home.
Source: Cullen International.
3 Risk Premia
The first alternative scheme we consider is adding a risk premium, which
compensates the incumbent for bearing both demand uncertainty and the
exercise of the entry option. This is current practice in a number of member
states of the EU, where an additional margin is applied to the weighted average
cost of capital (WACC) that enters the computation of the access charge, see
Table 1.6
Increasing WACC indirectly results in a higher access charge. For simplic-
ity, we look at increasing the access charge directly, as we want to focus on
the effect of adding a margin. For a < ā, the effects of the access charge on
the incumbent’s expected profits are
d
da









i.e., they do increase with the access charge.7
We first observe that if the aim of the risk premium is to increase coverage
(rather than generically to compensate the incumbent for risk), there is no
need to impose a risk premium for z ≤ zs because these areas are covered
anyway, while doing so would reduce consumer surplus and welfare. Second,
an access charge a ≥ ā simply keeps the entrant out and thus leads to monopoly
coverage. The latter of course neglects the loss in consumer surplus. Thus we
consider, for each area z ∈ (zs, zm], the lowest local margin m that still lets
the incumbent break even in expectation:
c(z) = E[Π∗0 (a+m, δ)].
This margin m increases with z, from m = 0 at zs to m = ā− a at zm. In the
newly covered areas, this added margin has two negative effects: It directly
reduces consumer surplus after entry, and it reduces the set of demand states
in which entry happens in the first place. Thus there is a cost in terms of
6 This augmented WACC is then applied to the fixed capital employed to obtain a capital
cost estimate, after which an estimate of operating costs is added.
7 We have made a weaker assumption on the entrant; but e.g. with quantity competition
and strategic substitutes its profits are indeed decreasing in the access charge.
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lost potential consumer surplus and welfare when risk premia are used. On
the other hand, the above also shows that coverage of all areas up to the
monopoly benchmark can be achieved while at least some entry continues to
be viable.
4 Access Options
The logic of access options is quite different from mark-ups on the standard
access charges. It is to formalize the notion that the right to access after the
network has been built is of value to the entrant and it puts a price on it.
This price is paid ex ante and increases the incumbent’s incentives to build
the network in the first place. Once the option has been bought, the entrant’s
choice of entry and the resulting retail market outcomes are the same as under
the standard tariff with the same access charge.
Again, there is no need (on the incentive side) to intervene in the covered
areas z ≤ zs. For each uncovered area z ∈ (zs, zm], the entrant must pay an
access option price A that gives it the right to ask for access later at an access
charge ã. In order to provide incentives to invest, the option price must cover
at least the expected loss of the incumbent, E[Π∗0 (ã, δ)]− c(z) +A ≥ 0, while
acceptance by the entrant implies that it cannot exceed the entrant’s expected
profits, A ≤ E[Π∗e (ã, δ)].8 Combining both constraints, we find
c(z) ≤ c(zo) = E[Π∗0 (ã, δ) +Π∗e (ã, δ)].
This means that the maximum coverage zo that can be reached by using access
options is limited by the joint profits of both firms at the access charge ã. Since
these joint profits are below the monopoly profit, this implies that coverage
with entry remains below the monopoly benchmark level. In more expensive
areas, access options will lead to monopoly.
As with risk premia, the regulator faces a trade-off between coverage and
consumer surplus in the newly covered areas.9 But since expected joint profits
exceed the incumbent’s profit, at any given access charge more areas can be
covered, or equivalently, coverage of any specific area can be achieved at a
lower access charge than with a risk premium,
E[Π∗0 (ã, δ) +Π
∗
e (ã, δ)] = E[Π
∗
0 (a+m, δ)]
with ã < a+m < ā. This leads both directly to higher consumer surplus and
welfare, and to more ex post entry. Still, the same coverage can be reached by
8 We assume here that access without option payment is no longer offered. If it was still
available, then one would set a lower access charge in return for the option payment, ã < a,
and the constraint on the option price would be stricter, A ≤ E[Π∗e (ã, δ)−Π∗e (a, δ)]. As a
result, achievable coverage is lower.
9 As pointed out by Inderst and Peitz (2014), combining an access option with a lower
access charge, while increasing consumer surplus, further reduces investment incentives since
the retail market becomes more competitive.
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setting the access ã high enough (up to ā in the limit). In other words, the
access option is welfare-superior to a risk premium.10
5 Long-Term Contracts
As a final alternative we consider access contracts where the entrant commits
ex ante to buying a given quantity q̄e at an access charge a0, with the possibility
to buy more access later at price a. The idea behind these contracts is to
eliminate the access externality, and reduce uncertainty for the investor, by
guaranteeing a minimum wholesale revenue in all demand states. We will show
now that these contracts have strong adverse side effects because they make
the market more competitive ex post, for two reasons. First, since the entrant
has committed to paying for the quantity q̄e, ex post the cost a0q̄e is sunk and
therefore the entrant’s effective marginal cost, up to qe = q̄e, is zero, which
makes the entrant compete more fiercely. Second, for the same reason it enters
in more states of demand.
In order to formalize this, denote by q∗e (a, δ) the ex post Nash equilibrium
(in the absence of the contract) quantity at access charge a and willingness to
pay δ; assume that q∗e is strictly increasing in δ and strictly decreasing in a.
We now need to distinguish three cases.
Case 1: The committed quantity is too small ex post, i.e. q̄e < q∗e (a, δ), or
in other words the state of demand is too good: δ > δ̃(a, q̄e) for some function
δ̃ increasing in a and q̄e. The entrant buys the additional quantity q∗e (a, δ)− q̄e,
and profits are Π∗0 (a, δ) + (a0 − a) q̄e and Π∗e (a, δ)− (a0 − a) q̄e.
Case 2: The entrant sells exactly q̄e in equilibrium, i.e. q∗e(a, δ) ≤ q̄e ≤
q∗e(0, δ), or δ̃(0, q̄e) ≤ δ ≤ δ̃(a, q̄e). This market outcome corresponds to the
Nash equilibrium at a virtual marginal cost α(q̄e, δ), decreasing in q̄e, defined
by q̄e = q∗e(α, δ), with α(q̄e, δ) = a at q̄e = q∗e(a, δ) and α(q̄e, δ) = 0 at
q̄e = q
∗
e(0, δ). The resulting profits are Π∗0 (α(q̄e, δ), δ) + (a0 − α(q̄e, δ)) q̄e and
Π∗e (α(q̄e, δ), δ)− (a0 − α(q̄e, δ)) q̄e.
Case 3: q̄e is too large, q̄e > q∗e (0, δ) or δ < δ̃(0, q̄e). The optimal choice for
the entrant is to use only the quantity q∗e (0, δ), with profits of Π∗0 (0, δ)+a0q̄e
and Π∗e (0, δ)− a0q̄e.
10 While in the present setting the entrant will be worse off since the option price extracts
part or all of his expected profits, access options continue to be welfare-superior when the
entrant cannot be made worse off, e.g. if the standard access tariff a were still available. But
coverage cannot be increased, as E[(Π∗0 +Π∗e )(ã, δ)−Π∗e (a, δ)] < E[Π∗0 (a, δ)] for ã < a.
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[Π∗0 (a, δ) + (a0 − a) q̄e] dF (δ).
It is clear that expected profits increase in a0q̄e, but there are countervailing
effects. The first term indicates that there is now competition in (some or all)
previous monopoly states, at zero effective marginal cost. The second term
shows that for medium demand states competition now occurs at the lower
virtual marginal cost α(q̄e, δ) < a, while the third term is affected by the
difference between a0 and a. The overall effect on the incumbent’s profits, as
compared to the benchmark case, is ambiguous.12
6 Conclusions
Policy makers and regulatory institutions face a difficult trade-off between
creating incentives for investment in next-generation fiber networks and main-
taining competition via access provision. In this paper we compared several
variants of pricing access and their effects on entry and coverage.
We first confirmed that, due to the diffusion of rents caused by entry, cov-
erage under a standard access scheme is lower than for a monopolist, who
provides maximum coverage without further subsidies. Existing European leg-
islation only allows subsidies to be given in regions that will not be covered
under market conditions. Our work complements this legal requirement by
showing how market-led coverage can be increased, and by how much, if con-
ditions for access obligations are rethought. This in turn helps policy makers
to concentrate subsidies on the most outlying areas.
There is indeed scope for improving investment incentives. As reported in
Table 2, we showed that risk premia, i.e. additional margins on top of the cost-
based access charge, can restore coverage incentives even in the most costly
areas. This comes at the price, though, of increasing the entrant’s marginal
cost, reducing ex post entry and consumer surplus in the newly covered areas.
Access options, where the entrant pays an ex ante fee to gain access at
standard access charges later on, do not affect ex post entry thresholds and
11 This would be the case without fixed costs. In their presence there would still be a
monopoly in the very worst demand states.
12 In the simulation in the Online Appendix, a small committed quantity raises coverage
by a little if uncertainty is high, and not at all if it is low. Higher committed quantities lower
coverage significantly, though.
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do not distort ex post market outcomes. The incumbent’s coverage increases
strongly, though, but not all the way to monopoly coverage.
Long-term contracts where the entrant commits to buying some fixed min-
imum quantity after investment, on the other hand, do not tend to induce
higher coverage, because any benefit from more certain wholesale demand is
countered by more competitive retail markets ex post, reducing investment
incentives.
Thus different access schemes are optimal depending on the type of area to
be covered: Access options are preferable to risk premia where they are feasible,
i.e. where the sum of profits without an extra access margin exceeds investment
cost, because they do not distort ex post market outcomes. More outlying areas
can only be covered using risk premia, which carry a cost in terms of achievable
total surplus. To make this more intuitive, consider various types of countries
that differ in their geography. In relatively flat countries, such as Belgium
and the Netherlands, our results show that access options are the preferable
solution to coverage issues. On the other hand, in countries where deployment
costs increase steeply outside of urban areas (mountainous countries such as
Italy and Switzerland), access options are not feasible (investment costs cannot
be covered without adding an extra margin to the access price) and risk premia
need to be used instead. In other countries that have both types of areas, such
as France and Spain, the adoption of a mix of instruments is called for.
There are several issues that we leave for further research. First, we as-
sumed throughout that the entrant has only one alternative to choose from,
since we compared all schemes to the outside option of staying out of the local
market. It is easy to see that the entrant would prefer the standard access
scheme to each of the three alternatives, because these involve either addi-
tional payments or restrictions on ex post choices. We did not consider (and
this may not be a very interesting question anyway) how the entrant would
freely choose among the alternative schemes.
Second, by concentrating on a setting with a single entrant, we have not
fully modeled the potential benefits from competition, nor the implications of
more entrants on using the various access schemes.
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Finally, we have not given attention to concerns about “margin squeeze”,
the situation where the entrant’s margins over the access charge are too low to
break even. For a start, this is difficult to analyze under demand uncertainty:
If an access scheme is fixed ex ante, the entrant’s margins will be low in bad
demand states, which is the very reason that the option not to enter has value
to the entrant. To our knowledge, the issue of margin squeeze under demand
or cost uncertainty has not yet received attention in the literature.
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